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PUBLISHER'S NOTE 
The articles which appear in this pamphlet were 
first published as a special supplement to The 
Cornell D d y  Sun of October 26, 1961. We are re- 
printing them in this form, by agreemeat with 
The Sun and the authors, because we believe that 
the views of six distinguished members of the 
faculty of one of our leading universities on what 
is perhaps the moat fateful issue of our time de- 
serve to be circulated far beyond the confines of 
the univemity community to which they belong. 
It goes without saying that publicatim in this 
form no more implies v e n t  between the 
authors and editors of MONTHLY REVIEW than 
publication in The Cornell Daily Sun implied 
agreement between the authom and the editors d 
The Sun. 
The Editors of MONTHLY REVIEW 
THE AUTHORS 
HANS A. BETHE, one of the nation's most distinguished theo- 
retical physicists, is John Wendell Andemn Professor of 
Physics at Cora4 Recipient of mamy honors, he was most 
recently named winner of the Enrico F e d  Award for 
1961 by the United States Atomic Energy Chmmm . . on* 
DOUGLAS F. DOWD is Associate Professor of Economics at 
CornelI. 
MARIO EINAUDI, Goldwin Smith Prof- of Government 
at Cornell, is the Chairman of the University's Department 
of Gqvernmcnt. 
WALTER Fa WEltBER, Assistant Professor of History at Cor- 
nell, specializes in the study of United States foreign rela- 
tions, 
PHILIP MORRISON is Professor of Physics and Nuclear 
Studies at CorneIl. During World War I1 he worked on 
the Manhattan Project in Chicago and at the Los b o s  
Laboratory in New Mexico. 
JAY OREAR, Associate Professor of Physics at Cornell, has 
made a special study of disarmament and related problems 
of inspection and control. 
DISARMAMCNT, 1945-1961 
B Y  W A L T E R  F .  LAFEBER 
nYcttiaresinthefintf iftaen)rearsof&tqmt-~a 
paid d histoay, either the Eut or Wcst has ~~d sbe 
an tabk with d o u s  intations of kssening world ten- 
thnmgb disarmament or a cessa6ion of nudear tastn Th?t 
t b r s e d f ~ ~ f ~ b a t r ~ b e e n ~ 1 % ~ ~ e s s f d , i n i n w d t b e ~  
~ W o n  of a thirty-megaton bomb and the U d d  States ro 
sumpion of nudear testa and a conventional arms buildup, is 
one of the most tragic failures in world history. 
Thc &st puid en cum^ only five dayr ia 1946. Ten 
months after the fiRt atomic bomb obliterated Japmcsc tm 
r i m ,  Bemd Baruch appmd before the United Nations to 
moLc a weeping Arnakm propasal for the daa--don d 
atomic weapons. Based on a report drafted by Under Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal (with m e  unique 
d~ntribubions fmm Baruch), the American plan had four rcwm- 
ma&-. 
Fint ,  an I a ~ t i o n a I  Agency would be estabbhctd tb 
d dom the complete dimhadon of a t d c  wapoas. 
'Odly dm this war aCcoInphad, the Unitad st~aes wmkl 
scrap its own a t d c  w - v ,  the only such weapons any 
nation then . Sexan& the Agency w d d  have almost 
ample& r igh~  of impedion, @ally over which might 
bc ooavated d y  from peaJu1 purpc#les to wcapoas pdnc-  
dm. Third, md tbia was Baruch's idea, the Agemy d d  b e  
tae right to punish any ndon which violated the agreement 
with, ar Baruch tamed it, "dt, wue and condign punbh- 
ment." Fourth, no nation could bran& the veto pomr cmr 
any acts of the Agency. 
WALTER LAFEBER 
vim, as d i s h  as any .plan could possibly be. U n f ~ ~ t c l y ~  
the plan was h heavy handed and naive. Andrei Gromyko 
stated the first Russian objection by noting that it was not in 
the Soviets' national interest to allow the Agency to divest 
otherions of atomic weapons, or the capability of making 
themy while the United States held on to its weapons. He pro- 
posed the scrapping of atomic weapons and then a promise 
not 'to build such mapons again. Moreover, .he charged, the 
lack of the veto threw the power of the Agency into Western 
hands. Not d y  would thip mean Western control of Russia's 
atomic arms ploduction, not only would it make easy violation 
of RUaaa's internal security possible, but it would also give the 
W a e m  powers a grip on Russia's use of atomic energy in the 
rebuilding of her own peacetime industries- 
The g h d ,  of the Baruch plan hovered over disamament 
negotiations until 1954, when the United States offidally wit311 
drew its propositions, but it was only a ghost The plan had been 
killed b y  Gromyko five days after Baruch had made the pro- 
posal- 
Between 1946 and 1954, the fruitless negotiations were of 
much less importance than a concurrent change in the world 
balance of power. In 1949 the Russians exploded an atomic 
bomb. By 1954 both the United States and the Soviets had 
discwered.the more highly volatile secret of the hydrogen bomb. 
The Berlin blockade, Korean War, formation of NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact heated the Cold War. 
President Eisenhower opened the second period of earnest 
negotiations when he proposed the atoms-for-peace plan in late 
1953. Under this plan, governments holding fhionable materials 
would contribute a share of them to an International Atomic 
Energy Agency. This was not a proposal of disarmament, but 
R d a n  agreement to the plan offered hope that new approaches 
to weapons reduction might be productive. 
In June, 1954, the United States, Britain, and France pro- 
s~ a plan of ''total prohibition" of both nuclear weapt& and 
conventional armamemts, which would be safeguarded by in- 
spection. To everyone's surprise and to the chagrin of the Ameri- 
can government, the Russians accepted the plan in principle. 
Washington spun into turmoil because at the very time it 
was proposing complete nuclear disarmament, it was a h  mak- 
ing massive nuclear retaliation the backbone of American rnili- 
tary strategy. The two were contradictory. This became more 
evident as the talks continued into 1955 and the United States 
began backing and filling. The Admbistration came out with 
the "Open Skies" proposal (aerial inspection of nuclear weapom 
stocks), but observem noted this was a retreat fmm the 1954 
prop&, for it had nothing to do with disarmament. 
In March, 1955, Harold Stassen became the Special b 
sistant to the President for Disarmament. Spumed on by his own 
sincerity, political ambition, and the President's real desire for 
disarmament, Staslen entered into serious negotiations. 
But for two years he had to fight pitched battles on not one 
but two fronts, against the Russians in Geneva, and against 
John Foster Dulles and Atomic Energy Co-ion Chairman 
Lewis Strauss in Washington. Neither Dulles nor Strauss be- 
lieved agreement with the Russians to be possible or desirable. 
By mid-1957, Stassen had been maneuvered into several costly 
politid mistakes* Thus the second period c l d  with Stassen 
running for the mayor's job in Philadelphia and Sputnik I spin- 
ning around the earth. 
The third period opened with a technical conference at 
Geneva, July 1, 1958. The object of the disarmament talks had 
now narrowed. Instead of complete disarmament, the negotiators 
merely hoped for agreement on a ban on nuclear tests and the 
creation of an inspection commission to insure enforcement of 
the ban. 
Agreement seemed possible in late 1958 and 1959 until 
the United States conducted a series of tests (termed Hardtack 
11) and found that nuclear weapons as large as twenty kilotom 
could be exploded underground or in deep caves without detec- 
tiam. ,This rCOprDICd:thd. dbCM& md do tlgpcmrnld. bo 
machd. Tho abjwdvcr war rmchd wkhaut qpxmmtx w b q  
b a i b l b h o n d  thelUnkcd Stattsdsflaffdr bath in 
Uctdxr, 1958, but.thc Urrid 8 ~ e s  did nat gat Q inqmixion 
o f . t h t b h ~ c % % h * d p l a h e d \ f a . m b s n ' c o ~ p D t i l  
Augast 31, 49611 , .  I 
~ ~ ~ a ~ t i o n ~  into dace  cbtemhd 
t i o l i a d a k k S T ( ~ h  
dbsgmpmeat. Aha s e v d  I M v e  w&, A.r&ur 
~ . ~ ~ b ~ O c n c V a ~ f ~ A m a i c a n p r g n a r l q p a -  
hapr'the hrost b v t  d w w  plapoaed twdke.nrmual.in- 
spedtms of Soviet tenitary instad &.the *twenty whichtht 
Wbt pmviddy ckmilllded. Dean was promptly met l$vi& the 
Met :dartiurd for a vetu which d d  work b t ~ g h  a tmib- 
c & w  t€immmmt inspection team. Deadto& r f & d ,  
b m h  by the arpldm ofhthe Soviet tests in Septcmbar,. 
%The- admhktra~sll har noc* estddhd- a 'new 
Agency' with a tiiream 'hqmkiMe dkckly 66 tgte 
S#setarp of State and P d d a t .  It makes r dktixiet (bruL with 
thc ISsenhawm em whm c thma~at  satdies wtkc made ah xi 
prplllad for clhamamm imtb 195OSs1 Tk ,new 
A m 9  with o m t ' a f  250 i~btoh~-%hdYitlg'a 
a.miumiA p m b I q  will, ii k hoped,'niOt only hdp pnpue the 
Unired States for possible dimmamenh bnt dcviir new a p  
pro- snd ideas to make t$barm- poedble, I 
I - 
THC TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS 
BY H A N S  A .  B E T H E  
The negotiations to discontinue testing of nuclear weapons 
began with high h o p  in July, 1958. The First stage was "The 
Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Vie  
lations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear 
Tests," which met in Gtnwa in July and August 1958. This 
Conference was attended on the Western side by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, all of these 
countries having some experience in a t d c  energy, although 
only the U.S. and the U.K. then had atomic weapons. 
On the Eastern side the Soviet Union was accompanied by 
Czechoslwakia, Poland, and Rumania, three pavers without 
ittmnic atpcrimct, but thede were included because of the Soviet 
hshtente on ''parity.)' On each side the delegations includ'ed 
many scientists of various specialties, particularly nucleat phy- 
s ic&~ and seismologkts. The Conference agmd on various 
methods of detection, and in nearly dl technical mattas the 
Westem point of vitw ~~"evailed. It turned out that our Russfm 
coflewe 'simply had nat studied the problem as well as we 
had. We were encouraged by the fact that the Russians when 
confronted with scientific esdence were willing to accept our 
resulg. 
The Conftrence reported that detection of mclear, u- 
pI&om was &asiib~e d m  to a certain level. According to the , 
report, expldons in tht air and under water could be detected 
dawn to about one kiloton, while for undegrwnd a c p l d m  
tht Sfmit wa;r about five kilotons. To make detection p i l e ,  
the 6mfe~tna recommended a f d y  daborate systun d ob- 
m & n  s~tions, a total of 180 d ~ b u ~  over the whole 
M A N S  A. BETWE 
world, plus on-site inspection of events which could be suspected 
of being an underground explosion. 
The report of the experts was received with some enthu- 
siasm both in Washington and in Moscow. It was the first time 
that any official meeting between East and West had agreed 
on concrete measures of disarmament. President Eisenhower 
cded for an end of nuclear testing by October 31 and for a 
meeting of a political organization of the three nuclear powers 
to start on the same date. This proposal was accepted. 
Prior to the Experts Conference, in March 1958, the 
U.SmS.R had unilaterally declared that they were stopping 
nuclear weapons tests "forever" if other countries would follow 
suit. This declaration came at a time most opportune for the 
Soviets, namely, when they had just F i h e d  a most extensive 
series of nuclear tests and when we were just about to begin 
one, a fact well known to the U.S.S.R. The U.S. could not very 
well have cancelled that series. It might, however, have been 
wiser to stop at the end of August after the Experts Conference 
instead of waiting until October. Instcad, the Russians, taking 
our own tests as an excuse, resumed testing in October 1958 
aad carried out over a dozen tests in that series. 
In my opinion they profited from this far more than we 
did from the tests between August and Octok. In addition, 
tlre total radioactivity put into the air by the Russian tests in the 
fall of 1958 was considerably greater than that resulting from 
the more numerous tests conducted by the U.S. in the Pacific 
in the spring and summer of the same year. 
The political conference which convened on October 31, 
1958, found the going hard from the very bcgimifag. There 
were many points of disagreement and the Russim wae.vay 
tough negotiators. I attended the first three weeks of this con- 
ference, and seeing the slow progress, I told the negotiaton, 
facetiously that I would see them again during the coming 
summer when I might spend my vacation in Switzedand. .Un- 
fortunately, I turned out to be a great optimist: The conference 
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continued almost three yeam and then was ended by the Russian 
tests. 
In late 1958 a concerted attack on the Geneva negotiations 
began in the U.S. Some results of the U.S. underground tests 
in Nevada in October, 1958, indicated that detection and iden- 
tification of underground explosions was more difficult than 
had been assumed by the experts and that the Geneva system 
of stations could probably detect and identify such explosions 
only down to twenty kilotons. Research was initiated to improve 
the detection capability. Albert Latter, a physicist of the Rand 
Corporation, discovered a method to conceal nuclear explosions 
from detection in enormous cavities. Although it has never been 
proved in practice, the theoretical possibility was undeniable 
and this raised the question of treaty violations without detection. 
Similar problems existed for the detection of nuclear weapons 
tests if they could be carried out in space with the help of 
satellites. Largely because of these technical difficulties the 
U.S. pursued the test cessation negotiations in 1959 with less 
than full vigor. 
Nevertheless, the negotiations in Geneva made substantial 
progress. Agreement was reached on most feature. of the control 
organization. The establishment of detection stations in the 
U.S.S.R. was agreed upon; this meant a major victory for the 
Western point of view which maintains that disarmament agree- 
ments must be inspected, and a major breach in the Soviet 
position against infringement on their sovereignty. The Russians 
further conceded that a large fraction of the personnel at each 
control post should be international and only a small fraction 
should come from the host country. On the other hand the 
Western powers granted the U.S.S.R. parity of representation 
on the control commission, a political point on which the Rus- 
sians are very sensitive. The give and take on both sides was 
considerable and approximately equal. 
To overcome the difficulty created by the limited capability 
of the Geneva system of stations, President Eisenhower, in 
HANS A: B E V ~ ~ E  
Ftbruiuy 1960, pmpoaed that the test ban b u l d  be mflmed 
to those (relatively large) explosions which can be detected by 
tht Otacva system. This would have lwen a very reasonable 
agrektnt; if in the future tht detection could be improved 
&mug% r e ,  this would autornaItic8ny extend the test ban 
to smaller weapons. Russia accepted this proposal in principle 
but demanded that for a limited period, three to four yean, all 
ttjtrl hcIu&g the mall undetectable anes should be forbidden 
in a special moratorium. This was accepted by the Western 
pawe*. 
?he maat difficult problem was the question of inspecting 
places from which a seismic signal originates which might 
be tit& an earthquake or a nuclear explosion. The U.S.S.R. 
d d a d  the nxtrnh of inspections a political question and 
uffcrcd throt such iMpections a year on its territory. This num- 
ber was fidiml~usfy inadequate. An estimate of the number 
of earthquakes which ~uuld be mistaken for nuclear expldions 
and therefore would warrant an inspection was about 60 to 
100. Accordingly the West demanded twenty inspections, a num- 
ber which dean& reasunable e m  to some Russian scientists. 
P d d m t  Kehtfdy decided to pursue negotiations with 
.rmewed detemhation. A number of further substantial con- 
txssidns w m  made to the Rulssian point of view with regard 
the compoeitim of the control organization, the conduct of 
m c h  for improvement of the detection system, and others. 
Must importat, the U.S. government was now no longer 
M d t d  on the hue but forcdully backed the negotiations. 
The U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Arthur Dean, conducted 
the negotiadtms In great sincerity and impressed many neutral 
diphats with the forthrightness of the U.S. position. It would 
have seemed that under rhae conditions an agmment should 
have ban easily obtainable. Unfortunately, the Russians chose 
exactly this moment to reverse their policy. Without even await- 
ing the new U.S. proposals, they made new demands which 
appear cdculatexi to be unacceptable to the U.S., cog. to replace 
T H E  T E S T  BAN NE60TIATIONS 
the admm&mm r o f t h e c c m t m l ~ t i a b y a ~ h M  
there on it was a straight road to the resumption of testing by 
the U.S.S.R. on Septanbv 1 of this year, In fact, knowing the 
need for extensive preparations for nuckar testing, 1 I e v c  that 
the Russians had decided to resume testing by the time they 
returned to Geneva in March of this year. 
This decision of the U.S.S.R. is most regrettable. Their 
official reasonr hkhg tost resumption to the Balin erhsis make 
the ckkhn cven worse, and presumably have littk to da with 
thc actual reasons. These are probably that the Rnasian experts 
feel that the R& amma1 of nuclear weapons is conddanMy 
irrf&r to ours, an opkkoltl which I have held and publicly 
stated thFoughout the negotiations. However in one nspcct the 
Russian test resumption is perhaps a relief. When the Kuslams 
decided to tart they did this openly, and' did not resort to any 
of +the complicated mehds of cheating whieh had ban m 
feared by the U.S. opponents of the tcst ban. 
The failure of the p w g  test ban negohth~s is sad. 
However the test ban in itseif is not of great ipnprtance. The 
important! probk  P to go ahead on disannamant in general. 
CoruiderabIe pfogrcss has been made in tfiis country to makc 
thc public and the g o v m e n t  coasciom of the advantages of 
difamammt for our security. 
We now have a U.S. Disannarnent Agency. This Agency 
will be able to consider carefully any cbarmament measures 
faam 'the political, military, and technical paints of vim. On 
the surface at least the Russians profess to be in favor of & 
armament, and they have agreed with the US. an a reasonable 
though incomplite set of phupla of dkrmam&t. In spite 
of hdxtcks we must conthue to negotia"2e on this maJt im- 
portant problem. 
THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS 
, f * * L - . $ - >  . - i ; i  
.The Joint itatement of September 20 and Gilpatrc's speech 
of. -October 21 offer, in their different ways, considerable as- 
sistance in determining the point reached today by the United 
States and the Soviet Unhn in their negotiations on d~sarmh 
ment and arms control. They provide two sets of balance sheets 
from which one may proceed: the first diplomatic, the second 
Inilitasy. 
The Joint Statement issued on September 20, 1961, by 
the United States and the Soviet Union, sums up the general 
disarmament negotiations. Taken in its broadest significance, 
this is -an important document, even an encouraging one, if we 
do not become too insistent in trying to find out what it omits. 
The existence itself of the document is little short of the 
rniriw=uIous. Up to Septunber 19, the United States had virtually 
given up hope of issuing any Joint Statement. Why the Soviet 
Union produced the needed last minute concessions, remains 
randear. . 
We are struck first of all by the unusually wide scope of 
the lonerange goals to which the two powers subscribe. What 
is wanted is general and complete disarmament, and the estab- 
lishment of reliable procedures for the maintenance of peace 
in-accordance with the principles of the United Nations. War 
is ruled out 'as an instrument for settling international disputes. 
An international disarmament organization should be created 
within the framework of the United Nations. 
and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace 
4. .- .-,- PC- w 
P m i n g  closer.lto the heart of the matter, the two powera 
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agnx that any successful general disarmament program must 
be implemented on the basis of an agreed sequence, by stages, 
with each stage completed within specified time limits. In ac- 
cepting this view, the Soviet Union has come around to the 
position that the United States has held for so long that the 
ultimate goal of general disarmament cannot be achieved over- 
night but must be the result of gradual,' painstaking, carefully 
timed efforts, with separate stages, each leading to an agreed 
upon position. 
Finally, there is agreement on the issue that the tramition 
from one stage to the next is linked to a review of the im- 
plementation of the measures included in the preceding stage. 
There must be full verification of such measures and any ad- 
ditional control arrangements required for the next stage must, 
whenever necessary, be ready to operate. 
This then is the substance of the Joint Statement, and, I 
repeat, for this much we must be grateful. 
What is missing cannot, however, be underestimated, even 
if most of it appears to affect matters of procedure and the 
nature of controls. First, no a&eernent was possible on the 
composition and powers of the body within which disarma- 
ment negotiations (which have been at a standstill since June 
1960) are to take place in the future. We know that on lesser 
issues fruitful negotiations between East and West have in the 
past been stalled for years. 
But, second, on a major preliminary question of substance, 
one that the American government insisted should have been 
settled by the Joint Statement, no agreement was possible be- 
tween the two powers. The Soviet government was unable to 
accede to the United States request that the control machinery 
must not d y  guarantee that, from stage to stage, limitations or 
reductions on armaments take place as agreed, but that it must 
also be able to certify that retained forces and armaments do 
not exceed the levels permitted at any stage of the disarmment 
process. It is not only what is eliminated that mattas: what 
ooumt~ mn mum. T h e e  must be not d y  control 
o w . k m e n t !  then must be at least as much contrd wu 
remaining armambts to guarantee the security of all the pawas. 
Indcxd, we may say that recognition of the need of controls 
wer armaments is impIicity contained in point five of the Joint 
Statement, which reads: "All measures of general and complete 
disarmament &odd be balanced so that at no stage of the 
imphentation of thc treaty could any state or states gain 
military advantage and that the security is ensured equally for 
all." The idea of balance surely includes the thought that no 
unbalancing factors must be hidden at any time in the secret 
folds of the opposed military establishments. 
Since September 2 4  the two great powers have further 
~fdified their positidns, the Soviet Union negatively, the United 
States positively. 
On September 26, Gromyko told the United Nations that 
there is a basic disagreement between those whom objective is 
disarmament and those whase objective is control over arma- 
ments, and he ad&d that unless advocates of control of anna- 
&en& renounce their position, "disarmament talks will continue 
to be doomed to failure." This is the sort of statement which 
the h & t  Union cannot really expect to be taken, even by 
' d h t  of steady and monotonous repetition, as a basis for future 
ne&tiations. 
The United States, on the other hand, in the dkannament 
offered foIIowing President Kennedy's address to the 
United Nations, has now proposed that, from the very begin- 
ning af the first stage of the process of disarmament, any tram- 
fer of control over nuclear weapans to any nation that does not 
yet own them, be banned. This, of mume, is of the essence in 
the mclccdul development of any future plan for the control 
of nuclear weapons and it is goad to have the Amaicm position 
so f'vmly and poaitivdy stated on the em of the inevitably 
painful, eonvdonti  in which Washingtan md ' Bonn art 
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bound to en- whultvh. dfi*t'cwragc $4 x!numzd on 
both sides. 
The military balance sheet can be drawn up m6re quickly. 
It was most clearly summarized by the Deputy Secretary of 
Defeme, Rosvve1.l L. Gilpatric, who, on October 21, said, "In 
short, we have a second strilre capability which is at least as ex- 
tensive as what the Soviets can deliver by strilting first. There- 
fore, we are confident that the Soviets will not provoke a major 
nuclear conflict .'" 
The meaning of the statement is obvious. The United 
States is described as having placed a second strike capability 
beyond the reach of the Soviet Union. Thio gives us the cer- 
tainty that we can destroy the Sovia Union if the Soviet Union 
were to attack first. Therefore, the Soviet Union will n ~ t  a tack. 
In 1961 this, too, must be taken as a reassuring statement even 
though one wishes it might stand up better under the severe 
scrutiny of hard veflication. There an: some who feel that its 
blunt hanlnesp may in effect conceal some SOftn-. 
This is, then, our position: one of seeming military stale- 
mate which appears to promise the absence of war, and one 
of diplomatic deadlock which does not guarantee peace. 
The task confronting the United States and the Soviet 
Union must be that of breaking through the diplo~natic dead- 
lock. I cannot help feeling that the Joint Statement creates a 
tolenbly good basis for doing so, and that it is perhaps not 
impossible to see the hope of continued peace and of controlled 
armaments flow from it. 
ECONOMICS OF DISARMAMENT 
B Y  D O U G L A S  F .  D O W D  
I have been asked to comment on the probable effects of 
disarmament on the economies of the United States and the 
Soviet Union. One can make fairly safe predictions concerning 
such probabilities for the economy of the Soviet Union; for 
our own country, one is forced to speculate in terms of various 
assumptions, especially as regards the critical question of public 
economic policies. Let us look first at the simpler of the two 
cases, that of the Soviet Union. 
Two characteristics of the Soviet economy are central in 
an examination such as this: ( 1 ) it is a planned economy; (2)  
it is an economy still beset by many basic shortages. The com- 
biiation of these two characteristics means that any release of 
resources from arms production could and would be utilized to 
relieve shortages; directly or indirectly, production would be 
diverted in such fashion as to raise the level of material well- 
being of the Soviet consumer. The process of conversion would 
take time and pose difficulties, of course; but there would not 
be a drop in consumer goods production, and after a time the 
level would rise, and doubtless substantially. 
Thus, disarmament may be looked upon as an unmixed 
blessing for the Soviet citizen. One can state the conditions 
under which disarmament would be an unmixed blessing for 
the American economy as well. But, as will be shown below, 
these conditions are not likely to exist. 
It  is a commonplace that our economy is subject to alternat- 
ing periods of contraction and expansion-of depression and 
prosperity-and that the Soviet economy is not. Fundamentally, 
this characteristic of our economy derives from the profit motive 
that underlies all private production. This is not the place to 
put forth an explanation of business fluctuations. But it must 
be said that whether or not profits are expected-and made-by 
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businesses, and thus whether production will expand or con- 
tract, depends essentially upon the buoyancy of actual and 
expected demand for goods. Thus, the profitability of business 
depends upon the degree to which buyers of goods and services 
--consumers, business firms, foreigners, and the government- 
are maintaining-or, better, expanding-their purchases. With- 
out asking here what initiates such expansion, it is relevant to 
point out that a process of expansion (or contraction) is cumu- 
lative; it feeds upon itself. An expansion of purchases constitutes 
an expansion of someone else's income, and thus, potentially, 
of the latter's purchases; and so on. 
We may now ask: What would happen in the economy 
if the federal government were to curtail its expenditures on 
arms? The answer depends upon many things, but the most 
important are: (1 ) What else is the government doing? lower- 
ing taxes? increasing non-defense expenditures? what? (2)  What 
is the general condition of the economy when the cut takes 
place? 
Getting more specific, it is extremely unlikely that the 
United States would enter into any disarmament agreement 
that would entail a sudden and very large cutback in arms 
expenditures. For military, political, and economic reasons, the 
probability is quite high that any disarmament program would 
be phased. (Indeed, under "arms control" as distinct from 
"disarmament" plans, arms expenditures would be likdy to 
increase, at least initially. The American point of view leans 
strongly toward arms control schemes; the Soviet Union, of 
course, argues for "general and complete disarmament.") 
Let us assume here that a disarmament agreement is signed 
that would entail a phased program of, say, ten percent per 
annum for ten years, or ten percent the first year, fifteen per 
cent the second year, and so on. Under such a program, the 
federal government's demand for goods and services would drop 
an amount between four and five billion dollars a year, at least. 
On simple assumption, the government might, at one 
extremes simply reduce its tax co11ectiom by the same amount; 
at tht other simple extreme, it might increase its non-defense 
expenditures by an equivalent amount. In either event, or any- 
thing in between, difficulties would be encountered. Let its 
look b M y  at the nature of some of these difficulties. 
The economy is not like a balloon, taking in or letting 
out ;dr. It  has a highly specialized structure-in terms of sectors, 
industries, skills, and the l ikeand  the quality and quantity of 
p ~ u c t i o n  are determined largely by private enterprises wherein 
decisions must be made on the basis of an incomplete under- 
standing of the past and the pr&mt, and guesses about the 
future. 
There are of course certain industries and workers that 
are heavily specialized in arms production-e.g., the aircraft and 
electronics industries. If, as an accompaniment of arms reduc- 
tion, taxes were to be reduced proportionately, abwing con- 
sumem and firms to dispose of more income if they wished to 
do so, the likelihood is neverthelets quite small that such in- 
cnased private expenditures would find their way to the in- 
dustrip and worlrm directly affected by disarmament. Whether 
or not private expenditures mould increase to the necessary 
amount-apart from the direction-is iM a difficult problan. 
If, as is presently the case, industry is characterize& by 
&@cant excess capacity, and consumers are apparently well- 
st&& with hard goods (with spending increases shffting stead- 
ily * tot services, travel, and the like), a tax 'reduction would 
probably yield a dispmportionatdy low increase in private spend- 
ing. (Thia I-ikeIihood is greater to the degree that consumers 
and busin- become increasingly cautious because of dis- 
armament. ) 
To complicate the problem further, a given reduction of 
expenditures-by the government, in this case-does nut ehd 
there. If less material and labor are purchased for defense 
purpases, those who received the incomes from the production 
and sale of that material and labor will now be led to reduce 
their own buying activities, in tum reducing the inmes of 
0 t h -  That is, an initial reduction in expenditure will l d  to 
sonic multiple redudan in the levels of national production 
and i n m m c - - . d g  no other expenditures to rise. In o pra 
cariously balanced economy, a significant ~?leduction in a pu- 
t i cu b  area of expenditures can, in other words, initiate a 
dwaward spiraL . - 
So, if our economy were buoyant, and tending to gtow 
rapidly in the abence of military expenditur-and it is not 
and has not been for s e v d  years-an announced or actud 
cutback in military expmditures could have the same effect 
(with somewhat diffe~ent processes at work) in our own as in 
the' Soviet economy-productive resources would be rel-d 
for private purposes. But where, as is now true, military a-' 
penditures are acting as an important prop to the g a d  l e d  
of economic activity (and as a crucial factor in the health of 
particular industries), the partial or total ranoval of that prop 
is bound to have a depressing effect on the confidence of the 
business community, and on the lev& of income, employment, 
and pducti~n-for at least the short m. 
To avoid a short run (at least) depression, and to amelio- 
ratxi specific hardships, it would be necessary for thc govern- 
m a t  to increase its mn-military expenditures, perhaps in can- 
bination with some degree of tax reduction. This may mu$~d 
simple as a propcsition in axithetic. But even with non-rditary 
apenditurea inmasing proportionately disarmament pro- 
ceeded, there would be the structural problem of thos(: directly 
geared to arms production. (This structural problem is already 
with us in the form of the so-called hard con unemployment 
centering around industries and areas specialized to products 
and 6 c e s  that are being p d  by as the structure of h a n d  
changes and as technology impmves.) But would there be mw- 
d b m y  expendim of the appropriate amount? 
It is entidy clear, and scarcely disputed any more, that 
this country needs many facilities and services badly that cm- 
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not or should not be provided by private enterprise-in the 
areas of education, health, urban renewal, and so on-and that 
our economic aid is needed in the newly-developing countries 
overseas (aid which would directly or indirectly broaden and 
deepen the markets for our production). 
Because such forms of expenditure are badly needed and 
desirable, apart from the role they would play in countering 
depression, it would seem that Americans would welcome arms 
reduction as a glorious opportunity to find an easy economic 
justification for such expenditures. Such is not, of course, the 
case. It is one of the curiosities of our society that proposals 
for expenditures on military goods--despite, or perhaps because 
of, their uselessness-are approved without question; with, in- 
deed, a certain enthusiasm. But proposals for a schoul, the 
rehabilitation and development of a region, for slum clearance, 
and similar matters, are widely looked upon with suspicion, and 
even anger. Such attitudes may or may not have been harmless 
in our youth as a nation; today they are ludicrous at best, 
lunatic at worst. They are also pervasive. 
Doubtless in time we shall learn that the attitudes a p  
propriate to a raw and rapidly expanding society-and one with 
much industrialization yet to be accomplished-are wildly in- 
appropriate to a highly industrialized, "affluent" society. Until 
that time comes-and if it is in sight now, it is only barely so- 
the major probability attendant upon a significant arms re- 
duction program in this country is a proportionately, or even 
more, significant depression. 
Of course, there is little optimism these days about dis- 
armament prospects; but that situation could change for the 
better. Were it to do so, it is alarming to note that virtually no 
systematic work has been done on the economics of disarma- 
ment in this country, whether by those in or out of the govern- 
ment. This devil-may-care attitude perhaps provides us with 
the real meaning of the notion inscribed on our coins: "In 
God We Trust." 
CAN WE FIND A WAY? 
BY P H I L I P  MORRISON 
Through the fragile plate of my office window I can see 
the high looping contrail of a B-47, built for a payload of five 
or ten megatons, headed for his base at Utica, it seems. The 
arabesque in the blue sky makes a tranquil autumn scene, yet 
it implies a blinding paroxyem of vio1ence. It is this extra- 
ordinary tension between the form and the content of power 
today which dominates the times. 
The Berlin crisis will, I believe, soon end in partial resolu- 
tion amid much pettifogging. Tough old General Clay dropped 
the right hint over cocktails: somehow East Germany would 
have to become real. The facts cannot be blinked away: they 
rest in the indisputable growth of Soviet power and prestige 
relative to our own in the last decade. 
The arrangements of 1945, even of 1950, can hardly b i d  
the Russia of Titov and Tupolev by the bargains of the war- 
weary and ruthless Stalin. Within the U.N., and in the divided 
territories which were the legacy of the war, the Soviets have 
had rather lets than the parity to which they feel themselves 
now entitled. The security of all their arrangements for Eastern 
Europe is still without our acceptance, and they see in this, 
perhaps irrationally but not without all reason, the German 
power as the nearest and most familiar of demons. 
There is here the kind of insistence upon the juridical 
expression of shifting power which nations have tended to 
honor in the past, or to deny only at the price of war. Since 
no vital concern of the United States appears to be a k t  
sufferer under a German arrangement of some sensible kind, 
one may predict that the deeper-lying questions of prestige will 
somehow be glossed over in a diplomatic settlement. 
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F a r r n ~ r e ~ u s t h q n t h e i s u e b e f i i n d , ~ ~ a i s i s ~  I 
believe, been the a c t  of the peripheral activities on both 
sides of the Arctic. The Soviet ,goyement which, had many 
times spoken against the consequences of fd-out, and which 
was heid to favor strongly an unenforced vo1untary ban on tests, 
began a large pmgram of nuclear tests. Here too one can see 
aa iasistmce on parity, but now not juridical or e~oaomic but 
cnglitmyb aad ~contisned to the frigbteaingly nurcrw objectives 
*d the d4SaTeIlt. 
; , -73~ Fo-r D ~ C S  of his Xirst m, with b+df- 
- r i g h t m ~ ~ ~  .his. disdatp for the Wgr,Bd, hjs cmctns + far 
''negotiation from strength," and his delicate halance on tbe 
brinlc, seems to have found a post somewhere in the Swiet 
F ~ r e i p  Office. Tbe Twenty-Second Party Congrm meets to 
'clb~w~tbe, program for free rent in a decade, and hears first 
:af cdl a promise to fire fifty megatons? 
- . Meanwhile, the American Friends of the Bomb, in no 
-yay by the clear dunomtxation that a voluntary 
test ban was not, after dl, aet much what the Saviets wanted, 
'may & expected to press for a new beginning to American 
megatm tests, ,so that the Soviet bid for test parity will remain 
: f m t d .  Anything you can #do, I CM 60 worse, is their inter- 
national slogan of the time. Mr. McCone, new C.I.A. bead, is 
sfietman Bomb Friend, too, which cannot be held good news. 
, In a runarkably candid interview, the Foreign Ministn 
of the Chinese Pmples' Republic, General Chea Yi, spoke his 
.slind rather masonably to the Reuten' man recmtly. In pm 
cisdy the vein of the US. and Soviet Ministers in the past, 
Chian Yi observed that symmetrical @on of the theme 
nuclear weapon by China was indeed the only guarantee of 
peace, for then same fonn of nucleat disarmament would at last 
-become .p~ssibl~. Surely thEs situation, which lies a @ few 
y m  &away, would recapitulate the U.S.-U.S.S.R. w m p ~  nice 
: mtlyr -But whether the triangle tbus f m e d  would attract many 
by its peaceful: m e t r i e s  is k sure. 
CAIJ! *W6 F I , N O  PA W A Y ?  
A continuous development of the events of 1957-1961 is 
thus placed before us by this bitter season. The shifting af 
power will be mirrored by a full-scaIe ernploymeat of the threat 
of nuckar war, from event to event, from criPis to Crisin OPI the 
one aide, a new, a "better'' test; on the others a mendafious 
and socially corrosive division of the people into the shelterd 
and the d e .  This is the logic of the unimpeded a m  ncc 
Only a discontinuity can end it; the discontinuity can either be 
that of war to destruction, or that of diplomatic policy. 
Our country is the most urban, the wealthiest, and thedore 
the most vuherable of the great powers-Eumpean powers have 
h o s t  too little area to count-and our policy has indeed been 
the model for the present norm. It seems, therefore, that to 
seek a discontinuity in the arms policy of the United States 
is the least risky of all the risky paths our government can take. 
In the next couple of yearn, we ought to find ways of 
demonstrating that we see long-run gains from a slowing of 
the arms race, even if they be bought by a transient loss to 
our pasition, our apparent prestige, or our "military posture." 
Three such appear to me to be plainly possible: first, a publicly- 
stated decision to make no more atmospheric tests; second, an 
early formal U.N. recognition of the Chinese Peoples' Republic, 
with its full post in the Security Council; third, a unilateral 
declaration by us that the U.S.A. will not initiate the use of 
nuclear weapons of any caliber under any circumstances, though 
this last might imply an enlarged preparation for non-nuclear 
warfare. 
Perhaps there is a chance that our intentions will go astray, 
that we would not come closer to peace by such measures. But 
it is as plain as a distant fireball on a clear night, that there is 
plenty of risk in our present course, the 'risks indeed of Ameri- 
can suffering are far beyond any in the annals of our history, 
and they imply worse yet abroad. A wise leadership pressed by 
a public opinion as determined as is the shelter-co~ction 
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industry, has still time to act. But each year now the otha 
pattan becomes more firm. 
Professor Fred Hoyle told us last year of his stark vision: 
that the earth's population rises to a peak, and then falls pro 
cipitately by violence. Then it rises once more, as industry is 
slowly rebuilt, and then the decline begins again. And so the 
species d a t e s ,  until somehow stability enters. Can we find 
a way to dampen out this oscillation now at the first peak? 
Or must we go down to the maelstmm many times, till the good 
tidings come from far away? It is not hyperbole to say that the 
next decade will answer. 
THE MEANING OF PUGWASH 
B Y  J A Y  O R E A R  
In addition to the official U.N.-spomred disarmament 
conferences that have been held over the past 15 years, there 
have more recently been several private, unofficial, East-West 
conferences on disarmament. The moat significant of these are 
the so-called Pugwash Conferences of Scientists which were 
initiated in 1957 as a result of appeals fmm Bertrand Russell, 
Albert Einstein, Albert Schweitzer, and Eugene Rabinowitch. 
The h t  of these conferences involved bringing real Com- 
munists, both Russian and Chinese, to North America. As 
might be expcted, this was automaticaUy frowned upon by the 
State Department of John Foster Dulles. Consequently the first 
of these conferences had to be held in Canada rather than the 
United States. The controvemial American capitalist Cynur 
Eaton gave the necessary financial support for the first thret 
of these conferences. In fact the First conference was held at 
his summer estate in Pugwash, Nova Scotia. 
The seventh in this series of conferences was held in 
September in Stowe, Vumont. The value of these informal 
contacts between leading scientists of both sides is now ap- 
preciated in Washington, with the consequence that this Iast 
conference was largely financed by a grant from the Ford 
Foundation. In fact the State Department even agreed to let 
two Chinese scientists come; however, the Qlinese then refused 
to come to this country because of "this country's interference 
in Taiwan." On the other hand the State Department was up 
to its old standards in refusing at the last minute to admit a 
physicist from East %emany. Also a leading Ruslrian biochemist 
at our conference had recently been refused a visa to attend a 
conference on carbon at Penn State. 
JAY OREAR 
The format d tl9w P u ~  emf- b tPoar mw~@ 
and surprisingly & d d .  Typically, a d k  or so 'politi&y 
aware scienth from each side live toget& 24 hours a day 
for a week or two in relative isolation. The setting has wiually- 
brm a m t d y  located ski lodge (off season). Ideally, one 
- gets to h a w  the Russian scientists personally and begins to 
forget w b  .is a. R d  and w h ~  is not, h$at of the time is 
spmt in ~ p - ~ ~ n  C O I L Y Q ~ ~ ~ ~  wba* one un spePk 
mcm frankly than normal. Each t h e  there have be- several 
N~bel- prize wimm and governmental d e m .  . 
atrnwg the R h  reached its peak at the, 6+ conference hdd. 
in MQSCPW Inst December. My fvst experience with those con- 
femmoes was at the third one ip Ki~bubl, AAaetria, Stptunber, 
1958. Here the Saviet participants tended to partkipate ls 9 
g r o u ~  mhtr*than as independent thbkcm-at least in the 
f w d  discuGw. But two years later at the Moscow conference: 
they hgan to adopt the westera approach to independent d k  
cuqbn. For the . F i  time the Russians would argue and db 
agrpe: with each otbcr publicly. They conducted the meeting 
in a flexibb, i n f d  way that encouraged free and open 
exchange of ideas. . . 
F Q ~  exunpk, wh& a leading Soviet military stntcgist was 
tqhg tsmalre a point at the blackboard, two af the America 
pwticipmts plus one mom Rw&m rushed up Pnd the four 
of tbegwaqped it out using the blackbad The point the 
Anpzicans were making had the force of logic behind it, with 
t$e end result of the Russians admitting that there was-a bask.. 
s ~ ~ g  to the inspection pvSoa;s of the afficial Saviet 
dimmamat plan. The American who first d e d  up to the 
blackboard became the Presidential SebWic Advisor a month 
later; 
- . At tbe Stave Conference in September9 the Ru&ms would 
still occoasi~nally. cbagret with one another; but because of 
their resumption of nuclear t ~ a b ,  the atmaphere was not the 
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same. Nevertheless, at Stowe and at Moscow, the Russians have 
taken a quite liberal point of view toward inspection for dis- 
armament. They even aaan agreeable to giving up some military 
secrecy before any disarmament actually takes place. Same of 
than suggested that inventories of weapons and military form 
should be disclosed at the very beginning of the first stage. 
They did not object to the early spot checking of the veracity 
of these inventmies, utilizing complete inspection over limited 
geographical regions. 
The regions to be inspected first could be chosen purely 
at random or they could be chosen by the other side (the 
principle of you cut and I choose which is so highly successful 
in solving disputes between children). 
This present liberal-Soviet attitude stems from the official 
statements of Khrushchev. I quote from the official Soviet 
statement of August 3 1 (New York Times, August 31, 1961 ) : 
'The Soviet Government has stated openly that it is ready to 
accept in advance any proposal of the Western powers on 
international control. Only one thing was expected from the 
Western powas and that was to accept our proposals on general 
disarmament and to submit their proposals on general control." 
Our Soviet colleagues at Stowe and MOSCOW kept telling us, 
''YOU write it up, and we will accept." 
The so-called "disarmament plan" presented to the U.N. 
by President Kennedy does not meet this challenge. What Ken- 
nedy presented was not a disarmament plan, but merely a list 
of some principles of disarmament. It did not spedfy when and 
how much of what is to be disarmed, or just how it is to be 
inspected. I feel our gwernment has the serious responsibility to 
come forth with a detailed and concrete plan leading to general 
and complete disarmament. Then if Khrushchew is sincere and 
if he doesn't change his mind (as he did on the test ban), we 
can start to make progress; if not, we shall at least have called 
his bluff, as we bdatedly did on the test ban. 



